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AppendixAbstract
In this paper we develop the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE)
in which there are many sectors with overlapping contracts of di⁄erent
lengths. In economies with the same average contract length, mone-
tary shocks will be more persistent when longer contracts are present.
We are able to solve the puzzle of why Calvo contracts appear to
be more persistent than simple Taylor contracts: it arises because of
the distribution of contract lengths. When we choose a GTE with
the same distribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo, the
economies behave in a similar manner.
JEL: E50, E24, E32, E52
Keywords: Persistence, Taylor contract, Calvo.
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This paper develops the concept of the Generalized Taylor Economy
(GTE), in which there can be many sectors with di⁄erent contract lengths.
This has the simple Taylor economy as a special case: there is only one con-
tract length in the economy. This framework can be used to model either
wage or price-setting behaviour. There is clear evidence of heterogeneity of
contract lengths within and between economies.
We apply this concept to wage-setting behaviour in a Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium Setting. We look at the issue of persistence in an
impulse-response setting. In this literature, there is something of a consen-
sus in theory-consistent parameterizations of DSGE with Taylor contracts,
nominal wage or price rigidity does not generate as much persistence as is
seen in the data.
We ￿nd that even the presence of a small proportion of longer contracts
can signi￿cantly increase the persistence of output in response to a monetary
shock. In two economies with the same mean contract length, the one with
more dispersion will exhibit more persistence.
We apply this to an empirical distribution of contract lengths for the US
compiled by John B Taylor. We show that when we use this in a DSGE
model with standard calibrations the persistence is similar to the empirical
persistence.
We then apply the GTE approach to solve another puzzle. We can cali-
brate the GTE using the distribution of completed contract levels generated
by the Calvo model of price-wage setting. In the existing literature, it has
long been noted that a Calvo economy appears to be signi￿cantly more per-
sistent than a simple Taylor economy with the same mean contract length.
We solve this puzzle.
First, we show that the standard calibration of Calvo and Taylor has been
wrong: it has confused the age of a contract with the completed or lifetime
duration of the contract. In steady state, the average age is about half the
corresponding average completed lifetime. So, Calvo economies are compared
with Taylor economies which have almost half the average completed contract
length. This is one source of the larger persistence in Calvo models.
Second, we show that even if you calibrate the Taylor and Calvo to have
the same mean contract length, Calvo is still more persistent. That is because
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each sector is Taylor, but the distribution of contract lengths is exactly the
same as the Calvo. The persistence of the two economies is almost the same.
The slight di⁄erences between the Calvo and Calvo-GTE occur because
of the wage-setting decisions. The Calvo-GTE wage-setting is more myopic.
This is because when there is a distribution of contract lengths, the shorter
contracts show up more amongst the ￿rm-unions who reset wages. This
explains why the output response in the Calvo-GTE is a little larger earlier
on and a little less later on.
The intuitive explanation of why longer contracts tend to dominate is
because of a sort of spillover e⁄ect through the general price-level. The
general price level aggregates prices of each sector, which depend primarily on
wages in that sector. When setting wages, wage-setters look at the trajectory
of prices in the future. If longer contracts are present, they tend to make
the general price more sluggish. This then a⁄ects the wage-setting of shorter
contracts who react by less since the general price level is more sluggish.
Hence the sluggishness of long contracts is infectious.
We believe that the GTE has a wide range of applications, wherever the
diversity of wage or price setting is thought to be important. It will also help
us to understand the implications of using the Calvo model and suggests a
unifying framework that embraces both the Taylor and Calvo models.
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"There is a great deal of heterogeneity in wage and price setting.
In fact, the data suggest that there is as much a di⁄erence between
the average lengths of di⁄erent types of price setting arrangements, or
between the average lengths of di⁄erent types of wage setting arrange-
ments, as there is between wage setting and price setting. Grocery
prices change much more frequently than magazine prices - frozen or-
ange juice prices change every two weeks, while magazine prices change
every three years! Wages in some industries change once per year on
average, while others change per quarter and others once every two
years. One might hope that a model with homogenous representative
price or wage setting would be a good approximation to this more
complex world, but most likely some degree of heterogeneity will be
required to describe reality accurately."
Taylor (1999).
There are two main approaches to modelling nominal wage and price
rigidity in the dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) macromodels: the stag-
gered contract setting of Taylor (Taylor (1980)) and the Calvo model of
random contract lengths generated by a constant hazard (reset) probability
(Calvo (1983)). This paper proposes a generalization of the standard Taylor
model to allow for an economy with many di⁄erent contract lengths: we call
this a Generalized Taylor Economy - GTE for short. The standard approach
in the literature has been to adopt a simple Taylor economy, in which there
is a single contract length in the economy: for example 2 or 4 quarters1. As
the above quote from John Taylor indicates, in practice there is a wide range
of wage and price setting behavior resulting in a variety of contract lengths.
We can use the GTE framework to evaluate whether the hope expressed by
John Taylor that a representative sector approach "is a good approximation
to this more complex world".
An additional advantage of the GTE framework is that it includes the
Calvo model as a special case, in the sense that we can set up the GTE to
1This is not to ignore some recent papers that have allowed for two sectors with di⁄erent
contract durations, such as Aoki (2001), Erceg and Levin (2002), Carlstrom, Fuerst and
Ghironi (2003) or with multi-sectors such as Mankiw and Reis (2003). However, these
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an important contribution in itself since the two approaches have until now
appeared to be distinct and incompatible at the theoretical level even if they
are sometimes claimed to be empirically similar (see for example Kiley (2002)
for a discussion). As we shall show, a simple Taylor economy can indeed be
a good approximation to a Calvo model, but only if the two are calibrated
in a consistent manner.
We develop our approach in a DGE setting following the approach of As-
cari (2000). The issue we focus on is the way a monetary shock can generate
changes in output through time, and in particular the degree of persistence of
deviations of output from steady-state. Much recent attention has been de-
voted to the ability of the staggered contract approach of Taylor to generate
enough persistence in the sense of being quantitatively able to generate the
persistence observed in the data. Two in￿ uential papers in this are Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) (CKM herafter) and Ascari (2000). Both pa-
pers are pessimistic for staggered contracts. CKM develop a microfounded
model of staggered price-setting and ￿nd that they do not generate enough
persistence and conclude that the ￿mechanism to solve persistence problem
must be found elsewhere". Ascari focusses on staggered wage setting, and
￿nds that whilst nominal wage rigidities lead to more persistent output de-
viations than with price setting, they are still not enough to explain the
data. Based on these conclusions, it is commonly inferred that in a dy-
namic equilibrium framework, staggered contracts cannot generate enough
persistence.
In this paper, we follow Ascari in focussing on staggered wage-contracts.
However, we show that by allowing for an economy with a range of contract
lengths, the presence of longer contracts can signi￿cantly increase the degree
of persistence in output following a monetary shock. We calibrate the model
in a way that in either the CKM or Ascari setting would not generate much
persistence. We show that even a small proportion of longer contracts can
signi￿cantly increase the degree of persistence. For example, we consider
the case of a economy where 90% of the economy consist of simple 2-period
Taylor contracts, and 10% have 8-period Taylor contracts (the average is
2.6 quarters) and show that the economy has a marked increase in output
persistence. We also take an empirical distribution of contract lengths (from
1-8 quarters) for the US taken from Taylor (1993) and show that this will
generate a signi￿cant degree of persistence. The intuition behind this ￿nding
is that there is a spillover e⁄ect or strategic complementarity in terms of wage-
8
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the general price level is held back in response to monetary shocks. This in
turn means that the wage setting of shorter contracts is in￿ uenced and hence
they adjust by less than they otherwise would.
It has long been observed that in the Calvo setting there can be a sig-
ni￿cant backlog of old contracts: for example, with a reset probability of
! = 0:25 (a common value used with quarterly data), there is a probabil-
ity of over 10% that a contract will survive for 8 periods (see for example
Erceg (1997), Wolman (1999)). We construct a GTE which has exactly
the same distribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo distribution
(as derived in Dixon and Kara (2005)). We ￿nd that this Calvo-GTE has
similar persistence to the Calvo economy. The remaining di⁄erence between
the Calvo economy and the Calvo-GTE is in the wage-setting decision. We
￿nd that calvo reset ￿rms are more forward looking on average than in the
Calvo-GTE. This is because short contracts are more predominant amongst
wage-resetters in the Calvo-GTE than in the economy as a whole, simply be-
cause wage-setters with long contracts reset wages less frequently. However,
for the calibrated values this does not make a big di⁄erence and indicates
that the two approaches of Taylor and Calvo can be brought together in the
framework of the GTE.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we outline the basic
structure of the Economy. The main innovation here is to allow for the
GTE contract structure. In section 3 we present the log-linearized general
equilibrium and discuss the calibration of the model in relation to recent
literature. In section 4 we explore the in￿ uence of longer term contracts on
persistence as compared to the simple Taylor economy, and in section 5 we
apply our methodology to evaluating persistence in the Calvo model.
2 The Model Economy
The approach of this paper is to model an economy in which there can
be many sectors with di⁄erent wage setting processes, which we denote a
Generalized Taylor Economy.(GTE). As we will show later, an advantage of
the GTE approach is that it includes as special cases not only the standard
Taylor case of an economy where all wage contracts are of the same length,
but also the Calvo process.
The model in this section is an extension of Ascari (2000) and includes a
9
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 489
May 2005number of features essential to understanding the impact of monetary shock
on output in a dynamic equilibrium setting. The exposition aims to outline
the basic building blocks of the model. However, the novel aspects of this
paper only begin with the wage setting process. Firstly, we describe the
behavior of ￿rms which is standard. Then we describe the structure of the
contracts in a GTE, the wage-setting decision and monetary policy.
2.1 Firms
There is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 [0;1]; each producing a single di⁄erentiated
good Y (f), which are combined to produce a ￿nal consumption good Y: The
production function here is CES with constant returns and corresponding


























Each ￿rm f sets the price Pft and takes the ￿rm-speci￿c wage rate Wft as








Where ￿ ￿ 1 represents the degree of diminishing returns, with ￿ = 1 being
constant returns. The ￿rm chooses fPft;Yft;Lftg to maximize pro￿ts subject
to (3,4), yields the following solutions for price, output and employment at
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Price is a markup over marginal cost, which depends on the wage rate
and the output level (when ￿ < 1): output and employment depend on the
real wage and total output in the economy.
2.2 The Structure of Contracts in a GTE
In this section we outline an economy in which there are potentially many
sectors with di⁄erent types of wage-setting processes. Within each sector
there is a more or less standard Taylor process (i.e. overlapping contracts
of a speci￿ed length). The economy is called a Generalized Taylor Economy
(GTE).Corresponding to the continuum of ￿rms f there is a unit interval of
household-unions (one per ￿rm). The economy consists N sectors i = 1:::N.
The budget shares of the N sectors with uniform prices (when prices pf are
equal for all f 2 [0;1]) are given by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1, the N vector (￿i)
N
i=1
being denoted ￿;where ￿ 2 ￿N￿1.
We can partition the unit interval into sub-intervals representing each





with ^ ￿0 = 0 and ^ ￿N = 1. The interval for sector i is then [^ ￿i￿1; ^ ￿i].
Within each sector, each ￿rm is matched with a ￿rm-speci￿c union: there
are Ni cohorts of unions and ￿rms in sector i. Again, we can partition the
interval [^ ￿i￿1; ^ ￿i] into cohort intervals: let the share of each cohort within the
sector be ￿ij so that
PNi
j=1 ￿ij = 1, with the Ni￿vector ￿i 2 ￿Ni￿1: Again,
we can de￿ne the cumulative share ^ ￿ij analogously to ^ ￿k. The interval of
￿rm-unions corresponding to cohort j in sector i is then
h
^ ￿i￿1 + ^ ￿ij￿1￿i; ^ ￿i￿1 + ^ ￿ij￿i
i
Clearly, if symmetry is assumed (cohorts are of equal size) ￿ij = N
￿1
i and
^ ￿ij = jN
￿1
i .
The sectors are di⁄erentiated by the integer2 contract length Ti 2 Z++,
which is the same for all cohorts within a sector. The timing of the wage
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of integers fTijg
Ni
j=2 which speci￿es when in the wage-setting cycle cohort j
moves . It is assumed that cohort 1 moves ￿rst (period 1): this de￿nes the
beginning of the cycle, so that 1 ￿ Tij ￿ Ni. If Tij = 3, it means that
cohort j sets its wage in period 3 periods after the ￿rst. By convention, we
assume that the js are ordered so that Tij is strictly increasing. Clearly, we
have the restriction of Ni ￿ Ti: there cannot be more cohorts than contract
periods. If Ni = Ti, then one cohort moves in each period: if in addition the
the cohorts are of equal size ￿ij = N
￿1
i , we de￿ne a uniform wage setting
process in sector i. If Ni < Ti, then there will be some periods when no
cohort moves. For example, we can consider a sector with 8 period contracts
in which there are two cohorts in which the second cohort moves 4 periods
after the ￿rst, Ti2 = 4. Alternatively, there might be three cohorts, with
timing f2;6g so that the second cohort moves in period 2 and third in period
6:
In order to fully characterize the economy with non-uniform wage setting,
we also need to specify the calender date ti when the wage-setting process
starts3 for each contract length Ti. In the case of an economy with uniform
wage setting processes in all sectors, the start dates are irrelevant, since each
period is exactly the same in all sectors (i.e. the same proportion of wages
are reset).
We can therefore characterize the wage setting process in a GTE by
(T;￿) 2 ZN
++ ￿ ￿N￿1 ; which gives the contract lengths and sizes of the N
sectors, and (Ni;￿i;ti) 2 Z++￿￿Ni￿1￿Z++ which describes the number and
relative size of the cohorts in each sector i, and the timing/synchronization







In the case where each sector has a uniform wage setting process, we have a
uniform GTE which is more simply parameterized by (T;￿)since (Ni;￿i) =
(Ti;T
￿1
i ) and ti is irrelevant (each period looks the same). A homogenous or
simple Taylor economy is one where there is just one sector with a uniform
wage-setting process.
3Of course, this is not unique: all that is required for each sector is the start date of
one cycle, since then the start date of all cycles is given.
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This can be further broken down into intervals for each cohort, where we
note that all ￿rms in the same cohort face the same wage and hence set the
same price pf = pij for f 2
h
















We can log linearize the price equations around the steady state , given the
wages. All ￿rms with the same wage will set the same price: de￿ne Pij as
the price set by ￿rms in sector i cohort j. This yields the following log-
linearization in terms of deviations from the steady state (where we assume







Note that there is an important property of CES technology. The demand
for an individual ￿rm depends only on its own price and the general price
index (see 3). There is no sense of location: whilst we divide the unit interval
into segments corresponding to sectors and cohorts within sectors, this need
not re￿ ect any objective factor in terms of sector or cohort speci￿c aspects of
technology or preferences. The sole communality within a sector is the length
of the wage contract: the sole communality within a cohort is the timing of
the contract. The vectors ￿ and ￿i are best be thought of as simply measures
of sector and cohort size. This is an important property which will become
useful when we show that a Calvo economy can be represented by a GTE.
2.3 Household-Unions and Wage Setting
Households h 2 [0;1] have preferences de￿ned over consumption, labour, and
real money balances. The expected life-time utility function takes the form
13
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;Hht;Lht are household h0s consumption, end-of period
real money balances, hours worked, and leisure respectively, t is an index for
time, 0 < ￿ < 1 is the discount factor, and each household has the same ￿ ow
utility function u, which is assumed to take the form
U(Cht) + ￿ ln(
Mht
Pt
) + V (1 ￿ Hht) (11)
Each household-union belongs to a particular sector and wage-setting
cohort within that sector (recall, that each household is twinned with ￿rm
f = h). Since the household acts as a monopoly union, hours worked are
demand determined, being given by the (7).







t+1) ￿ Mht￿1+Bht+WhtHht+￿ht+Tht (12)
where Bh(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(st+1 j st) at
state st and pays o⁄ one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized. Bht
represents the value of the household￿ s existing claims given the realized state
of nature. Mht denotes money holdings at the end of period t. Wht is the
nominal wage, ￿ht is the pro￿ts distributed by ￿rms and WhtHht is the labour
income. Finally, Tt is a nominal lump-sum transfer from the government.
The households optimization breaks down into two parts. First, there is
the choice of consumption, money balances and one-period nominal bonds to
be transferred to the next period to maximize expected lifetime utility (10)
given the budget constraint (12). The ￿rst order conditions derived from the





























Equation (13) is the Euler equation, (14) gives the gross nominal inter-
est rate and (15) gives the optimal allocation between consumption and real
balances. Note that the index h is dropped in equations (13) and (15), which
re￿ ects our assumption of complete contingent claims markets for consump-
tion and implies that consumption is identical across all households in each
period (Cht = Ct)4:
The reset wage is for household h in sector i is chosen to maximize lifetime
utility given labour demand (7) and the additional constraint that nominal
wage will be ￿xed for Ti periods in which the aggregate output and price level
are givenfYt;Ptg. >From the unions point of view, we can collect together

































Where Et represents the conditional expectation taken only over states of
nature in which the household is unable to reset its wage contract. Equation
(16) shows that the optimal wage is a constant "mark-up" (given by "
"￿1) over
the ratio of marginal utilities of leisure and marginal utility from consumption
within the contract duration, from t to t+Ti￿1 When Ti = 2, this equation
reduces to the ￿rst order condition in Ascari (2000).
2.4 Government
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The money supply Mt grows at a rate ￿t so that Mt = ￿tMt￿1: To fo-
cus on the role of the GTE in generating the output persistence, following
Huang and Liu (2001), we assume that there are no serial correlation in the
money growth process and therefore ln(￿t) follows a white noise process, i.e.,
ln(￿t) = ￿t; where ￿t is a white noise process with a zero mean and a ￿nite
variance ￿2
￿: More speci￿cally, we assume that the money supply follows a
random walk, i.e., mt = mt￿1 + ￿t:
3 General Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize equilibrium of the economy. We ￿rst describe
the equilibrium conditions for sector i and then the equilibrium conditions
for the aggregate economy. To compute an equilibrium, we reduced the equi-
librium conditions to four equations, including the household￿ s ￿rst order
condition for setting its contract wage, the pricing equation, the household￿ s
money demand equation, and an exogenous law of motion for the growth rate
of money supply. We then log-linearize this equilibrium conditions around a
steady state. The steady state which we choose is the zero-in￿ ation steady
state, which is a standard assumption in this literature. The linearized ver-
sion of the equations are listed and discussed below. We follow the nota-
tional convention that lower-case symbols represents log-deviations of vari-
ables from the steady state.










s [pt+s + ￿yt+s]
#
(18)




LL + ￿cc(￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿))
￿ + ￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿￿
LL
(19)
Where ￿cc = ￿UccC








Working Paper Series No. 489
May 2005Using equation (9) and aggregating for sector i, we get











Using equation (3) and aggregating for sector i yields
yit = ￿(pt ￿ pit) + yt (21)
Given the money demand equation (15), log-linerazing this equation yields
the following;
yt = mt ￿ pt (22)
Finally, the linearized price index in the economy is simply a weighted





4 The Calibration of Simple Taylor Economies
with Price and Wage setting
In this section, we examine whether our model can account for a contract
multiplier. Since the novel aspect of our paper is the incorporation of gener-
alized wage setting, it is useful to compare our results with identical models
that makes the standard assumption of a simple Taylor economy. However,
before presenting our main results by using the chosen parameter values, it
useful to discuss possible alternatives found in the literature and illustrate
their implications in simple Taylor economies. The parameters of the model
include the discount factor, ￿;the elasticity of substitution of labour,￿
LL;the
elasticity of substitution of consumption,￿
CC,the elasticity of substitution of
consumption goods, ￿, the monetary policy parameter, ￿t.
17
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Empirical studies reveal that intertemporal labour supply elasticity, 1=￿
LL,
is low and is at most 1. In particular, the survey by Pencavel (1986) suggests
that ￿
LL is between 2.2 and in￿nity. Following the literature, we set ￿
LL =
4:5; which implies that intertemporal labour supply elasticity, 1=￿
LL, is 0:2:
Following Ascari (2000), we set ￿= 6: Finally, we set ￿
CC = 1 and ￿ = 1,
which are all standard values used in the literature (see for example Huang
and Liu (2002)). Finally, we assume that at time t there is 1% shock to
the distrubance term corresponding to the money growth rate, ￿t; so that
￿(t) = 1 and ￿(s) = 0 for all s > t:
4.1 The Choice of ￿
The key parameter determining aggregate dynamics is ￿. The magnitude of ￿
is important since it governs how responsive household-unions are to current
and future changes in output (see equation 18). When there is an increase
in aggregate demand, households face higher demand for their labour and
therefore the marginal disutility of labour increases. With higher income they
consume more and marginal utility of consumption falls. The combination
of an increase in the marginal disutility of labour and the fall in the marginal
utility of consumption leads household-unions to increase their wage. The
coe¢ cient ￿ determines how wages change in response to changes in current
and future output. If ￿ is large, then wages respond a lot to changes in output
which implies faster adjustments and a short-lived response of output. On
the other hand, if ￿ is small, then unions are not sensitive to changes in
current and future output. In response to an increase in aggregate demand,
the wage would not change very much and hence wages are more rigid. In
the limit, if ￿ = 0, there will be no relationship between output and wages,
so that shocks are permanent. Hence the smaller ￿, the more wages are rigid
and hence the more persistent are output responses.
Estimating ￿ as an unconstrained parameter, Taylor found that for the
US ￿ is between 0.05 and 0.1. However, in a general equilibrium framework
￿ is derived so as to conform to micro-foundations. CKM ￿nd that with
reasonable parameter values, ￿ will be bigger than one in a staggered price
setting, whilst with staggered wage setting Ascari ￿nds the value of ￿ to be
0.2. Both CKM and Ascari argue that the microfounded value of ￿ is too
high generate the observed persistence following a monetary shock, hence
raising doubts over the Taylor model in this respect. In a general equilib-
18
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according to (19). In particular, its magnitude depends on the parameter
governing risk aversion, ￿cc; the labour supply elasticity, ￿
￿1
ll and the elastic-
ity of substitution of consumption goods ￿ (which determines the elasticity
of ￿rm demand and the markup from (3) and hence the markup (5)).
With staggered price setting, CKM ￿nd that with reasonable parameter
values, the value of ￿ is bigger than one: in particular with ￿ = 1
￿
CKM = ￿LL + ￿cc = 1:2 > 1
However, for CKM the value of ￿CKM could reasonably be much higher5: for
example with ￿
LL = 4:5 and ￿cc = 1, ￿CKM = 5:5: Huang and Liu (2002)
choose to set ￿
LL = 2, so that ￿CKM = 2:
The value of ￿ with wage-setting is much smaller. In our model, as in











Under our preferred calibration, ￿CKM = 5:5, and 1 + ￿￿
LL = 27; so that
￿A = 0:2. The value of ￿ under wage setting could arguably be much
smaller: some authors set ￿ = 10 and combined with a smaller ￿
LL = 2;
￿ = 1=7 = 0:14. The lower value of ￿ is signi￿cant and means that with
staggered wages the aggregate price level changes more slowly than with
staggered prices. This contradicts with the common view that both wage and
price-setting have similar implications for persistence. Altough the equations
are esentially the same, the the value of ￿ di⁄ers across the two settings (see
Huang and Liu (2002) for further discussion). Whilst Ascari (2000) shows
that output is more persistent with the staggered wage setting, he shows it
is still not persistent enough to generate the observed persistence in output.
We can illustrate how the magnitude of ￿ can a⁄ect the result by com-
paring the impulse responses using the values of ￿ from CKM and Ascari
(2000) and Taylor (1980). We assume a simple Taylor economy with T = 2
(wages last 6 months). All other decisions are made quarterly. We display the
5Since CKM were aiming to show that the staggered price model did not generate
enough peristence, they chose a value of ￿CKM which was low to make the model as
persistent as it could reasonably be.
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 489
May 2005impulse-response functions for output after a one percent monetary shock.
As we can see from Figure 1, in response to the one percent monetary shock,
output displays similar patterns in the case of ￿CKM = 1:22 and ￿A = 0:20.
For both cases, output increases when the shock hits and quickly returns to
its steady state level. For the case of ￿ = 1:22, output returns to steady
state level when both unions have had the chance to reset wages, i.e. two
quarters. Output is certainly more persistent with ￿ = 0:20, but not signif-
icantly. Finally, the impulse response of output in the case with ￿ = 0:05
originally used by Taylor (1980), which yields a level of persistence more in
line with the evidence, but not the microfoundations.
5 Persistence in a GTE
The existing literature has tended to focus on the value ￿ in generating per-
sistence. We want to explore another dimension: for a given ￿, we allow for
di⁄erent contract lengths in the GTE framework we have developed. Having
more than one type of contract length thus is necessary if the model is to
generate output persistence beyond the initial contract period. In what fol-
lows, we show that including longer term contracts can signi￿cantly increase
persistence. Of course, this is in a sense obvious: longer contracts lead to
more persistence, and we can achieve any level of persistence if contracts
are long enough (so long as ￿ > 0). However, we want to show that even
a small proportion of long-term contracts can lead to a signi￿cant increase.
Throughout this section, we will take the value of ￿ = 0:2 and explore how
persistence changes when we allow for a range of contract lengths. We do
this in three stages: ￿rst we simply illustrate our case with a simple two
sector example. Second, we use Taylor￿ s 1993 calibrated model of the US
economy allowing for contract lengths from 1-8 quarters. Lastly, we consider
the Calvo contract process with the corresponding distribution of contract
lengths from 1 to in￿nity.
5.1 Two-sector GTEs
First, let us consider the simple case of a two sector uniform GTE, fT;￿g =
f(2;8);(0:9;0:1)g : in sector 1 there are two period contracts, in sector 2
there are 8 period contracts: the short contract sectors produce 90% of the
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In Figure 2 we show both the simple Taylor economy with only 2-period
contracts alongside the GTE with 10% share of 8-period contracts. We report
the impulse response of aggregate output after a one-percent shock in money
supply as in Figure 16. As can be seen from the Figure 2, the GTE and simple
Taylor economy have dramatically di⁄erent implications for persistence. In
the simple Taylor economy with 2-quarter contracts, changes in money supply
have a potentially large but short-lived e⁄ect on output. In the GTE , the
presence of long-term contracts means that not only does aggregate output
rise following a increase in the money supply, but it is considerably more
persistent.
What is the intuition behind this ￿nding? We believe that the presence of
the longer term contracts in￿ uences the wage-setting behaviour of the short-
term contracts. This can be seen as a sort of "strategic complementarity". A
monetary expansion means that the new steady state price is higher. When
setting wages, unions trade o⁄the current price level and the future. The fact
that the long-contracts will adjust sluggishly means that the shorter contracts
will also react more sluggishly, since their wage setting is in￿ uenced by the
general price level which includes the prices of the more sluggish sectors.
There is a spillover e⁄ect from the sluggish long-contract sectors to the short-
contract sectors via the price level, a mechanism identi￿ed previously in
Dixon (1994).
We can perhaps best illustrate the contrast in terms of mean-equivalent
GTEs. In Figure 3a we have the output response compared in two GTEs
with a mean contract length of 2: one is a simple Taylor economy, the other
consists of mainly ￿ exible wages and 1=7 are 8 period contracts. The
presence of the perfectly ￿ exible one period contracts leads to a dampened
impact relative to the 2￿period Taylor. However, it is clear that although
the economy consists mainly of ￿ exible wages, the output dies away slowly
and after the second quarter output is larger in the mixed economy. This
is because the 8 period contracts are holding back the general price level
6We use Dynare to compute the impulse response functions. See Juillard (1996).
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economies output, the long-contracts 10%. The average contract length inand hence in￿ uencing the wage-setting of the ￿ exible sector. In Figure 3b
we have a simple 3 Taylor economy with a mixed one of 2 and 8 period
contracts. Again the impact is less in the mixed economy but soon becomes
more persistent.
5.2 Taylor￿ s US Economy
In this section we use the study by Taylor (1993). Taylor Calibrates the US
economy as T = (1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8); with sector shares being: ￿1 = 0:07;
￿2 = 0:19; ￿3 = 0:23;￿4 = 0:21;￿5 = 0:15;￿6 = 0:08;￿7 = 0:04;￿8 = 0:03:
We can note that the largest sector is 3￿period contracts, the three contract
lengths (3;4;5) each have about 20%, with a fat tail of longer contracts (as
many 7 and 8 quarter contracts as 1 quarter contracts). The average contract
length in this economy is 3:6 periods.
In Figure 4, we show the impulse response function for output in Taylor￿ s
US economy. We ￿nd a persistent response in output. In particular, the e⁄ect
of a monetary shock on output lasts roughly three years. It is evident that
incorporating generalized wage setting into a dynamic equilibrium model has
a signi￿cant e⁄ect on dynamic responses of output. We compare this economy
with the corresponding simpler GTE with an average contract length of 3.5
periods (T = (3;4);￿ = (0:5;0:5)). We can see that Taylor￿ s US economy
is more persistent: this is because it includes longer contracts despite having
almost the same mean.
To summarize this section, in Figure 5 we plot the output responses for 4
di⁄erent GTEs. The responses are normalized in the sense that the impact
is set at 1. From Figure 4 we have Taylor￿ s US economy and the 2-sector
GTE, from Fig 2 we have the simple Taylor with 2-period contracts and the
case with 10% 8 period contracts. We can also read o⁄ the half lives (and
quarter lives) of the impulse-response functions, which gives us a quantitative
measure of the degree of persistence. For example, when there is simple
Taylor economy with only 2-period contracts alongside the GTE with 10%
share of 8-period contracts, the half-life increases from 0.74 periods to 1.25
periods. This is also the case when we compare Taylor￿ s US economy with
the corresponding Simple Taylor Economy. In particular, half-life increases
from 1.98 periods to 2.53 periods.
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It has long been noted that Calvo contracts appear to be far more persistent
than Taylor contracts. In this section, we will show that if we focus on
the structure of contracts (as opposed to the wage-setting rule), the Calvo
economy is a special case of the GTE. Two main features of the Calvo setup
stand out as di⁄erent form the standard Taylor setup. First its "stochastic"
nature: at the ￿rm or household level, the length of the wage contract is
random. Second, that the model is described in terms of the "age" of con-
tracts (which includes uncompleted durations) and the hazard rate (the reset
probability !). On the ￿rst issue, the stochastic nature of the Calvo model
at the ￿rm level does a⁄ect the wage setting decision. However, apart form
the wage setting decision we can describe the Calvo process in determinis-
tic terms at the aggregate level because the ￿rm level randomness washes
out. At the aggregate level, the precise identity of individual ￿rms does not
matter: what matters is population demographics in terms of proportions of
￿rms setting contracts of particular lengths at particular times. Because
there is a continuum of ￿rms, the behavior of contracts at the aggregate level
can be seen as a purely deterministic process.
The second feature is easy to remedy: we can look at either Taylor or
Calvo contracts and describe them in terms of either the distribution of
completed contract durations (lifetimes) or in terms of the distribution of
ages - all durations (complete and incomplete): it is simply two ways of
describing the same process. First, we set aside the precise level of wages
and observe the duration of wages. We focus on the "demographics" of the
contract lengths in a Calvo process7. If we take a snapshot of the economy
in period t we will observe a proportion ! of wages being reset and the
remaining (1￿!) proportion not being reset. We observe the distribution of
durations: a proportion !(1￿!)s￿1 have been been in place for s periods: of
these, a propotion ! will reset in period s+1 (their duration was completed
at time s) and a proportion (1 ￿ !) survive until s + 1 (their duration was
incomplete at time s).
7For a discussion of "life span" and "age", in the unemployment duration literature,
see Salant (1977), Carlson and Horrigan (1983). These studies present some examples and
show that E [T j s] = 2!￿1: However, in discrete time speci￿cation needs to be a small
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i of ￿rms surviving at least s periods:
￿
s
i = ! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 : i = 1::1 (24)
with mean ￿ s = !￿1. In demographic terms, s is the age of the contract:
￿s
i is the proportion of the population of age s; ￿ s is the average age of the
population.





with mean ￿ T = 2￿!
! . In demographic terms, ￿i gives the distribution of ages
at death (for example as reported by the registrar of deaths): ￿i being the
proportion of the steady state population who will live to die at age Ti.
Assuming that we are in steady state (which is implicit in the use of
the Calvo model), we can assume that there are in fact ex ante ￿xed con-
tract lengths. We can classify household-unions by the duration of their
"contract". The fact that the contract length is ￿xed is perfectly compati-
ble with the notion of a reset probability if we assume that the wage-setter
does not know the contract length. We can think of the wage-setter having
a probability distribution over contract lengths given by ￿s
i in (24): Nature
chooses the contract length, but the wage-setters do not know this when they
have to set the wage (when the contract begins)9.
Having rede￿ned the Calvo economy in terms of completed contract
lengths, we can now describe it as a GTE. There are an in￿nite number
of sectors, each strictly positive integer corresponding to a contract length:
N = 1 Ti = i;i = 1:::1
The proportions of each completed contract length are given by (25):The
wage setting process in each sector is uniform: there are T
￿1







Let us just check that this will yield a contract structure equivalent to the
Calvo process. Since the wage setting process is uniform, we can consider the
8See Dixon and Kara (2005), Proposition 1.
9In game-theory terms wage-setting is done under incomplete information.
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The steady-state cross-section of contract ages can be described by therepresentative period. In the sector with Ti period contracts, a proportion
￿i=Ti contracts come to an end. Hence, using (25) and summing across all
sectors the total measure of all contracts in the economy coming to an end









2 (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 = ! (26)
If we look at this Calvo-GTE, the average observed duration of contacts
(completed and non-completed) will be !￿1. To see why, let us derive the
average age from the distribution of contract lengths. The proportion of
contracts age i is obtained by summing across all cohorts who reset wages i
periods ago. Clearly, this means we sum only over sectors with completed
















= ! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1
Hence, as in Calvo, the average age of contracts in a Calvo-GTE is !￿1
and a proportion ! of ￿rms reset their wages each period. The contract
demographics of Calvo and Calvo-GTE are indeed the same.
In Figure 6 we have the distribution of completed contract lengths in the
Calvo model with ! = 0:25, the distribution of contract ages (i.e. steady-
state durations, complete and incomplete), and for reference the distribution
of contract lengths in Taylor￿ s US economy. As can be seen, the modal
completed contract lengths are 3 and 4 quarters which have exactly the same
proportions (just over 10%), and the distribution beyond that tails o⁄, with
the mean being 7 quarters.
6.1 Wage-setting in the Calvo-GTE
We have de￿ned the Calvo-GTE in terms of the structure of completed con-
tract lengths. The only di⁄erence between the Calvo economy and the
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observations apply ot price-setting). In the Calvo economy, the wage-setter
is uncertain of the contract length: the wage-setting decision must be made
"ex ante", that is before the ￿rm knows which length nature has chosen.
This yields the standard Calvo wage-setting decision. Once the wage is set,
the ￿rm ￿nds out its contract length in due course10. By contrast, in the
Calvo-GTE, the wage-setters know which sector they belong to when they
set the wage. Hence, wages in each sector of the Calvo-GTE will be di⁄erent.
Taking the simple case of ￿ = 1, from (18) the reset wage in sector i with a






(pt+s + ￿yt+s) (27)
We can calculate the mean reset wage in two ways. First, we de￿ne the
unconditional mean reset wage, weighting the reset wages in each sector xit





However, if we take the mean conditional on the wage being reset (i.e. leaving












! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 xit (29)
Within the sector with i period contracts only i￿1 reset their prices each
period. Hence we weight each sector using the proportions resetting using
(26). Clearly, if we look at the ￿rms that reset their price, then the less
frequent price setters are under-represented relative to their share in the
total population. A union that resets every period (i = 1) is counted every
period, whilst a ￿rm that resets every 10 periods is only counted once every
10 periods. Note that the weights on the sector i contract xit is the same as
the Calvo weight for t + i periods ahead.
There are thus two main di⁄erences between the Calvo and the Calvo-
GTE wage-setting rules. First, in the Calvo-GTE there is a distribution of
10It does not matter when: either straight after the pricing decision or at the last moment
when it gets the Calvo phone call that it is time to reset the wage.
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distribution of prices across cohorts (de￿ned by when they last reset prices)
as in the Calvo model, the GTE has a distribution across sectors within the
cohort.
Second, the Calvo-GTE puts more weight on the immediate future than
the Calvo rule. If we expand (29) using (27), we can write the conditional
and unconditional mean reset wages in terms of current and future outputs
and prices (pt+s + ￿yt+s).
Proposition 1 Let ￿ = 1.




Cs (pt+s + ￿yt+s)
Cs = ! (1 ￿ !)
s










Clearly, the unconditional mean reset wage in the Calvo-GTE is equal to
the standard Calvo reset wage, with familiar Calvo weights Cs. However,
whilst this is a useful reference point, it is not the correct comparison, because
it is weighting by sector size, including those who do not reset wages. The
conditional mean gives the average reset wage across those who are resetting
the wage. The weights of the conditional mean reset reset wage are bs and
can be expressed in terms of the corresponding Calvo weights Cs :








If we look at the Calvo-GTE weights bs, they are a simple transformation of
the Calvo weights. Calvo weights on future prices are "passed back" along
the line. The general term bs has three elements: the Calvo weight Cs;
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s+1Cj; and





we can see that the Calvo￿GTE puts a much bigger weight on the more
immediate future than the Calvo rule. This is intuitive: in every sector
i ￿ 1 there is a proportion i￿1 weight on the current period t: in every sector
i ￿ 2 there is a weight of i￿1 period t + 1 and so on.
This is best illustrated by the cumulative weights: the Calvo-GTE weights
up to J are simply the corresponding sum of Calvo weights plus the total













In Figure 7 we show the distributions of weights Cs and bs with ! = 0:25:
As we can see, the weight for the ￿rst 2 quarters is larger than Calvo, and
subsequently less.
We can de￿ne the degree of forward-lookingness as the weighted mean of





Cs (s + 1) =
1
!
In the Calvo-GTE this is derived from (29). Note that the wage set
by the sector i cohort xit is the mean over periods 1:::i;so that the mean
forward lookingness in sector i is (i + 1)=2. Hence, from (29) the mean













Note that since ! < 1, FLC > FLCGTE. Hence in the Calvo-GTE, the
forward-lookingness of wage-resetters as a whole is less than in the equivalent
Calvo, with the ratio FLC=FLCGTE = 2
1+!. With ! = 0:25, the Calvo reset
price looks forward on average 4 periods, whilst the Calvo-GTE, the average
reset wage looks forward 2:5 quarters.
11We follow the convention of saying that the present (s = 0) is period 1 and so on.
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Hence FLT = FLC. This reinforces the insight that the reason that wage-
setting in the Calvo-GTE is more myopic than both the simple Taylor and
Calvo economies with the same mean contract length, is that in the Calvo-
GTE the longer contracts are "under-represented" in the wage-resetters be-
cuase they reset wages less frequently.
6.2 Persistence in the Calvo and Calvo-GTE compared
We now compare the Calvo-GTE and the standard Calvo economy in terms
of the impuls-response functions. In theory, the Calvo-GTE and the Calvo
economy are exactly the same in terms of contract structure. However, for
computational purposes whilst the Calvo economy e⁄ectively has an in￿nite
lag structure (via the Koyck transform), the Calvo-GTE has to be truncated.
Hence we also introduce a Calvo-Calvo-GTE: that is the GTE with the same
contract structure and wage-setting rule as the Calvo model, but truncated
as in the Calvo-GTE. For the simulations, we truncated the distribution of
contract lengths to 20 quarters T = 1;:::20. with the 20 period contracts
absorbing all of the weight from the longer contracts. When we apply the
standard Calvo pricing rule to this truncated distribution, it yields a percep-
tible but negligible di⁄erence; hence all of the visually apparent di⁄erences
between the Calvo-GTE and the standard Calvo model are due almost en-
tirely to the di⁄erence in wage-setting behaviour.
In Figure 8 we compare the impulse response for the Calvo-GTE which
has the same distribution of completed contract lengths as the Calvo dis-
tribution, with the standard Calvo economy for ! = 0:25. We ￿nd that
Calvo-GTE has very similar persistence to the Calvo economy. The e⁄ect
is as little larger for 6 quarters and a little less subsequently, re￿ ecting the
less forward looking pricing behaviour. We also show the standard Taylor
economy with the same mean contract length ￿ T = 7: Although the e⁄ect is
a greater for the ￿rst 5 quarters, the e⁄ect dies down and is signi￿cantly less
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are the same, the longer contracts in the Calvo and Calvo-GTE generate the
extra persistence.
To understand the di⁄erence between the Calvo and Calvo-GTE we can
focus on wage-setting behavior as depicted in Figure 9. In Fig 9a, we depict
the price level in the two cases. We see that the price level rises a bit more
in the Calvo case early on (for the ￿rst 6 quarters) and a bit less later on
(hence mirroring the comparison in terms of output we saw in Figure 8). In
Fig 9b we depict the trajectory of the reset wage in both cases: again the
Calvo reset wage is a little higher early on (for the ￿rst 4 quarters) and a
little lower later on. The e⁄ect of the permanent increase in the money
supply is to lead to an upward trajectory in prices. In the Calvo economy
the wage-resetters are more forward looking and so raise wages more in the
initial period in anticipation of the future price rises. This leads to a slightly
smaller increase in output in the ￿rst few periods. As the new steady state
is approached, the Calvo resetters slow down the increase in wages, whilst
the more myopic calvo-GTE wage resetters keep up the momentum of wage
increases, so that the output becomes a little larger in the Calvo case.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a general framework, the GTE which uni￿es
the previously disparate approaches of modelling dynamic price and wage
setting: Calvo and Taylor. The approach is a generalization of the simple
Taylor model to take into account the presence of a range of di⁄erent contract
lengths. We use this approach to focus on the e⁄ect of the presence longer
term contracts on the persistence of impulse-response functions generated by
a monetary shock. Our conclusions are the following:
￿ A small proportion of long-term contracts can generate a signi￿cant
increase in persistence.
￿ As shown in Kara and Dixon (2005), the average length of contracts
in the Calvo model has been seriously underestimated, because the
age and life-time of contracts have been confused. If modelers want
an average contract length of 4-quarters, they should choose a reset
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average contract length of 7 quarters.
￿ When we compare the standard Calvo model with the corresponding
Calvo-GTE, we ￿nd that although the wage-setting behavior di⁄ers,
the persistence of the two is very similar.
￿ The main di⁄erence in wage or price setting behaviour between Calvo
and Calvo-GTE is in the forward-lookingness of the wage or price set-
ting decision. In the GTE setting, longer contracts reset wages less
frequently and so are under-represented amongst wage-resetters rela-
tive to their share in the economy. This means reset wages are on
average less forward looking than in either the Calvo or simple Taylor
economy with same mean contract life.
￿ In general, if we want to model an economy with many di⁄erent con-
tract lengths using a simple Taylor economy, we should choose a con-
tract length which is greater than the average. This is becuase the
presence of contracts with longer duration leads to more persistence
despite having a similar mean.
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